Implementing Personalized Law:
Personalized Disclosures in Consumer Law
and Data Privacy Law
Christoph Busch†
This Essay explores how the rise of big data and algorithm-based regulation
could fundamentally change the design and structure of disclosure mandates in consumer law and privacy law. Impersonal information duties and standardized notices
could be replaced by granular legal norms that provide personalized disclosures
based on the personal preferences and informational needs of an individual. This
Essay makes several contributions to the emerging debate about personalized law.
First, it shows how information technology can be implemented for tailoring disclosures in consumer law and privacy law in order to take into account actor heterogeneity. Second, it argues that personalized disclosures should be conceived as a learning system based on feedback mechanisms in order to continuously improve the
relevance of the information provided. Third, this Essay explores the ramifications
of personalization for compliance monitoring and enforcement. Finally, this Essay
claims that, with the advent of the Internet of Things, the wave of the future, at least
in data privacy law, could be a mix of personalized defaults implemented through
virtual personal assistants and only occasional active choices.

INTRODUCTION
Mandated disclosures are probably one of the most widely
used regulatory tools in consumer law and data privacy law on
both sides of the Atlantic. 1 Long lists of standardized information
duties are the hallmark of EU consumer law directives, which are
based on the information paradigm and the model of the average
consumer. 2 Similarly, mandated disclosures are a standard staple
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1
See Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More than You Wanted to Know: The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure 3 (Princeton 2014) (“‘Mandated disclosure’ may be the
most common and least successful regulatory technique in American law.”).
2
For an overview of disclosure mandates in EU consumer law, see Christoph Busch,
The Future of Pre-contractual Information Duties: From Behavioural Insights to Big Data, in
Christian Twigg-Flesner, ed, Research Handbook on EU Consumer and Contract Law (Elgar
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of American consumer protection law. 3 One of the reasons why
disclosure mandates are so popular with lawmakers is their “ecumenical” nature. 4 For those who believe in the free-market principle, information duties have the advantage of regulating lightly
and minimizing market interference. From this perspective, mandated disclosures improve the functioning of markets by helping
to overcome information asymmetries without distorting markets
by specifying prices, quality, or contracts terms. In contrast, for
those who focus on consumer autonomy, mandated disclosures
are a well-suited tool for increasing consumer self-determination
and promoting consumer empowerment.
Similarly, despite many fundamental differences with regard
to data protection, the “information paradigm” is a common element of data privacy law both in the United States and Europe.
Contemporary data protection laws rest on what Professor Daniel
Solove has called a model of “privacy self-management.” 5 Under
this model, consumers shall exercise control over their personal
data and make informed decisions about the use of their data. Thus,
“notice and choice” has become the key element of self-regulation
of fair information practices in the United States. 6 Under this approach, “notice” is generally described in terms of transparency of
the information practices, while “choice” is typically defined in terms
of consent. 7 European data protection law, while more restrictive
than US privacy law, also largely rests on a model of “notice and
choice.” 8 Thus, under Article 6 of the recently enacted EU General

2016) 221, 224–25. See also generally Peter Rott, Information Obligations and Withdrawal
Rights, in Christian Twigg-Flesner, ed, The Cambridge Companion to European Union
Private Law 187 (Cambridge 2010); Thomas Wilhelmsson and Christian Twigg-Flesner,
Pre-contractual Information Duties in the Acquis Communautaire, 2 Eur Rev Contract L
441 (2006); Christian Twigg-Flesner and Thomas Wilhelmsson, Article 2:201: Duty to Inform
about Goods or Services, in Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law, ed, Principles
of the Existing EC Contract Law (Acquis Principles): Contract II 115–19 (Sellier 2009).
3
For an overview of disclosure mandates in US consumer law and other areas of
law, see Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U Pa L Rev 647, 651–65 (2011).
4
See Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More than You Wanted to Know at 5–6 (cited in 1).
5
See generally Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the
Consent Dilemma, 126 Harv L Rev 1880 (2013).
6
See Joel R. Reidenberg, et al, Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 Berkeley Tech L J 39, 42–46 (2015). See also generally Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age
80–83 (Cambridge 2018).
7
See Reidenberg, 30 Berkeley Tech L J at 43–44 (cited in note 6).
8
See id at 44–46.
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Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 9 informed consent is one of
several lawful bases to process personal data. 10 In addition, the
GDPR includes rules on giving privacy information to consumers
in Articles 12 to 14, which contain lengthy lists of mandated disclosures about data processing. 11 However, both in consumer law
and data privacy law, the information paradigm has attracted
fierce criticism. 12 A growing body of behavioral research has questioned the effectiveness of mandated disclosures as a regulatory
tool. The aim of this Essay is not to review once more why most
consumers neither read nor understand verbose and complex privacy notices or the lengthy disclosures mandated under consumer
protection law. Many articles 13 and books 14 have done this already. Some of them have even called for abandoning “disclosurism” generally, claiming that mandated disclosures as a regulatory instrument do not work and cannot be fixed. 15
This Essay takes a more optimistic view and argues that, in the
near future, many of the weaknesses of the current approach to disclosure could be cured with the help of data science and algorithmbased regulation. In this vein, Professors Ariel Porat and Lior

9
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 OJ
L119 1 (May 4, 2016).
10 Regulation 2016/679, 2016 OJ L119 at 36.
11 Regulation 2016/679, 2016 OJ L119 at 39–40, 41–42. Notice and consent is also an
important element of the international framework for transborder data flows. Thus, the
Safe Harbor agreement concluded in 2000 between the European Union and the United
States and the EU-US Privacy Shield, its 2016 successor, specifically include “notice” and
“choice” as two essential principles. See EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles
(US Department of Commerce, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/QT7M-GVXV.
12 See, for example, Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 159 U Pa L Rev at 651 (cited in note 3).
13 See, for example, Samuel Issacharoff, Martin Engel, and Johanna Stark, Buttons,
Boxes, Ticks, and Trust: On the Narrow Limits of Consumer Choice, in Klaus Mathis, ed,
2 European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics, Economic Analysis of Law
in European Legal Scholarship 107, 118–21 (Springer 2015); Anne-Lise Sibony, Can EU
Consumer Law Benefit from Behavioural Insights? An Analysis of the Unfair Practices
Directive, 6 Eur Rev Private L 901, 902–03 (2014); Annette Nordhausen Scholes, Behavioural Economics and the Autonomous Consumer, 14 Camb Yearbook Eur Legal Stud 297,
306–18 (2012); Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection, 167 J Institutional & Theoretical Econ 56, 61–64 (2011). See also generally Eva Maria Tscherner, Can Behavioral
Research Advance Mandatory Law, Information Duties, Standard Terms and Withdrawal
Rights?, 1 Austrian L J 144 (2014); Hans-W. Micklitz, Lucia A. Reisch, and Kornelia Hagen,
An Introduction to the Special Issue on “Behavioural Economics, Consumer Policy, and
Consumer Law”, 34 J Consumer Pol 271 (2011).
14 See, in particular, Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More than You Wanted to Know at
33–55 (cited in note 1).
15 See id at 183.
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Strahilevitz have argued in their seminal article that personalization could be used to design disclosures tailored to specific individuals in order to increase the relevance of the information and
to reduce the risk of information overload. 16 Indeed, as information technology evolves and the cost of data collection, storage,
and processing declines, the analysis of large volumes of unstructured data (big data) 17 could play a transformative role for disclosure as a regulatory tool. With the help of big data, it could be
possible to provide consumers with information that is tailored to
their situations, personalities, demographic characteristics, and
cognitive capabilities. The provision of such behaviorally informed (personalized) information instead of standardized (impersonal) information could increase the relevance of a disclosure
for the individual recipient of the information.
Starting from this premise, this Essay explores how such personalized disclosures could be operationalized and implemented
in the fields of consumer and data privacy law. This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I lays the groundwork by introducing the
concept of personalized disclosures and briefly outlining its theoretical foundations. Part II provides some illustrations of how
personalization, based on various metrics, could be implemented
to tailor disclosures in consumer law. Part III illustrates how personalization could work in data privacy law. Part IV deals with a
number of practical issues of regulatory design for personalized
law. In particular, it makes the point that personalized disclosures should be conceived of as a learning system based on feedback mechanisms in order to continuously improve the relevance

16 See generally Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules
and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich L Rev 1417 (2014). There is an emerging debate
about personalization in various areas of the law. See generally, for example, Omri BenShahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 NYU L Rev 627 (2016). See
also, for example, Cass Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of
Choice 157–73 (Oxford 2015); Christoph Busch, The Future of Pre-contractual Information
Duties at 221 (cited in note 2); Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules
and Standards, 92 Ind L J 1401 (2017); Philipp Hacker, Personalizing EU Private Law:
From Disclosures to Nudges and Mandates, 25 Eur Rev Private L 651 (2017). See also
Geneviève Helleringer and Anne-Lise Sibony, European Consumer Protection through the
Behavioral Lens, 23 Colum J Eur L 607, 629–30 (2017).
17 There is not yet a rigorous and commonly accepted definition of big data. See Viktor
Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform
How We Live, Work, and Think 6 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2013) (“There is no rigorous
definition of big data.”). For the purposes of this Essay, the term refers to new processing
technologies that make it possible to manage large quantities (volume) of heterogeneous
data (variety) at a high speed (velocity).
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of the information provided. Lastly, it addresses ramifications of
personalization for compliance monitoring and enforcement.
I. FROM IMPERSONAL TO PERSONALIZED LAW?
Legal norms usually formulate impersonal and abstract rules
that are supposed to cover a large number of individual cases: To
legislate means to generalize. 18 A tool for generalizing commonly
used by the legislators are “typifications,” which are normative
models that divide the infinite variations of the social world into
certain categories that create meaningful order. 19 Through the
use of typifications, situations that are, on closer inspection, heterogeneous are typified as homogeneous. Thus, the disclosure
rules of consumer law generally do not take into consideration the
informational needs of the individual consumer. Instead, they are
based on the fictional model of the average consumer, who is, in the
words of the European Court of Justice, “reasonably well-informed
and reasonably observant and circumspect.” 20
However, the rather crude one-size-fits-all design of disclosures based on typifications suffers from a certain degree of imprecision. The underlying typifications represent only a blurred
picture of reality and ignore what Oliver Wendell Holmes called the
“personal equation.” 21 In mathematical terms, typifications offer
only an approximate value. The use of such legal approximations
leads to regulatory errors and inequities caused by the over- and
underinclusiveness of the normative models. From an economic
perspective, one could argue that typifications are mainly used as
means for reducing complexity costs. 22 Developing a complex system of rules, exceptions, and counterexceptions is difficult not
only for the legislator. Standardized rules are also easier for targets of those rules (for example, businesses and consumers) to
communicate, to understand, and to comply with ex ante. Finally,
less complex rules are easier for courts to administer ex post.
18 Paul Kirchhof, Allgemeiner Gleichheitssatz, in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof,
eds, 8 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 697, 773 (Heidelberg
3d ed 2010). See also Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre 231–32 (Springer 1925).
19 See Michael D. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other: The Place of
Sociology of Knowledge in Alfred Schutz’s Phenomenology 36–37 (Bucknell 1988) (describing the use of typifications in sociology).
20 Gut Springenheide and Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor Steinfurt, Case C-210/96, 1998
ECR I-04657, ¶ 31.
21 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law 108 (Macmillan 1881).
22 See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J L Econ
& Org 150, 150–52 (1995).
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From this point of view, complexity costs related to the design
of legal norms are directly linked to the limited capacity of human
information processing. Thus, one could argue that the optimal
complexity of legal rules—and the granularity of the entire legal
system—is limited by the bounded capacity of human information
processing. From this perspective, one could also argue that the
widespread use of typifications is essentially the answer to an information problem—a concession to the imperfections of a legal
system administered by humans. In the near future, however, big
data, superhuman information processing capabilities, and artificial intelligence could redefine the optimal complexity of legal
rules and refine their content to a hitherto unachievable level of
granularity. 23 In such a scenario, granularized or personalized legal rules could take into account actor heterogeneity to a degree
impersonal laws are unable to do. As a result, regulatory errors
stemming from over- and underinclusive norms based on coarsegrained typifications can be reduced.
Against this background, standardized disclosures, as prescribed by current consumer and data privacy law, are a product
of the predigital and industrial mass society. Disclosures standardized in shape and content seem like a distant echo of Henry
Ford’s dictum that any customer can have a car painted any color
that he wants “as long as it’s black.” 24 This approach does not fit in
the digital economy. Indeed, in the field of manufacturing, there has
already been a profound transformation since the 1990s toward
mass customization, allowing consumers to customize their products with a range of components and colors. Currently, information
technology and increased precision in customer data are driving
the next wave of mass customization, making it even easier to
build unique products and services for individual customers.25
II. CONSUMER LAW
The idea of mass customization could easily be implemented
in the field of consumer law. The replacement of standardized information with personalized disclosures could reduce the amount
of information to be provided and, at the same time, increase the

23

See generally Casey and Niblett, 92 Ind L J 1401 (cited in note 15).
B. Joseph Pine II, Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition
7 (Harvard Business 1993).
25 See, for example, Russell Walker, From Big Data to Big Profits: Success with Data
and Analytics 91–92 (Oxford 2015).
24
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relevance of a disclosure for the individual recipient of the information. The following examples may illustrate how data on consumers’ purchasing habits and other patterns of past behavior
can be used for reducing both the quantity problem of information
overload and the quality problem of information mismatch, which
are associated with the one-size-fits-all approach to disclosure.
A. Product Information
Article 6(1)(s) of the EU Consumer Rights Directive requires
an online seller to inform the consumer before the conclusion of a
contract about “any relevant interoperability of digital content
with hardware and software that the trader is aware of or can
reasonably be expected to have been aware of.” 26 According to the
European Commission’s Guidance Document for the implementation and application of the EU Consumer Rights Directive, such
information should include details “about the necessary operating
system and additional software, including the version number,
and hardware, such as processor speed and graphics card features.” 27 Under the current model of standardized disclosure,
traders usually provide the information in a rather technical and
impersonal manner (for example, “This software requires Mac
OS X version 10.5.x or later.”). For less tech-savvy users who do
not know which operating system they are using, this information
will not be very useful. If, however, the device used by the consumer for accessing the online shop is identified by the shop’s software, the information could be provided in a more personalized
way (for example, “This product is compatible with the computer
that you are currently using.”). Additional information about the
interoperability with other systems that might be relevant only
for certain consumers could be relocated to a second layer of disclosure that is displayed only upon request (for example, “For
more information on interoperability, click here.”).
Personalization could also be used to make certain information
items more or less salient based on the consumer’s past behavior. 28

26 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2011 on Consumer Rights (EU Consumer Rights Directive), 2011 OJ L304 64, 76 (Oct 25 2011).
27 DG Justice Guidance Document concerning Directive 2011/83/EU *68 (European
Commission Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, June 13, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/9KH9-ML4A.
28 See, for example, Hacker, 25 Eur Rev Private L at 669 (cited in note 15) (suggesting that, if the purchase history of a consumer shows that she tends to miss deadlines for
withdrawal rights and often sends goods back after the deadline has passed, personalized
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If, for example, a credit card company offers one of its customers
travel insurance, the company is obliged under Article 3(1)(2)(a)
of the EU Directive on Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial
Services to provide “a description of the main characteristics of
the financial service.” 29 Under a personalized disclosure model,
the company could be obliged to take into account the available
data on the consumer’s credit card usage for tailoring the information about the insurance. If, for example, the credit card usage
data shows that the client regularly travels to Iraq or Libya, the
information about an exclusion of these countries from the insurance coverage should be made in a prominent way.
Similarly, data about a consumer’s purchasing history could
be used for personalized health warnings. A famous and often
cited example that illustrates this use case is the retailer Target,
which used data mining to identify pregnant women among its
customers. 30 Target’s data miners observed that pregnant women
were likely to buy certain nutritional supplements in their first
trimester, unscented lotion in their second trimester, and hand
sanitizer close to their due dates. 31 Knowing that the birth of a
child is a watershed moment in the customer relationship, when
shopping behaviors are open to change and new brand loyalties
are likely to emerge, Target used the information to send personalized advertising and coupons to the pregnant women. 32 From a
regulatory perspective, one could consider whether a retailer who
has obtained such insights through data analytics should be
obliged to use this information to provide consumers with targeted health warnings. 33 For example, a customer with a high
“pregnancy prediction score” could be confronted with a specific
warning message if she buys alcoholic beverages or raw cheese in
an online shop.
Maybe the last example seems a little bit creepy and overly
paternalistic. This could indeed be the case. Let me be clear: I am
not saying that the law should require online retailers to identify
law could require the seller to highlight withdrawal deadlines when this client orders
goods online).
29 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September
2002 concerning the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services, 2004 OJ L271
16, 19 (Sept 23, 2002).
30 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets (NY Times Magazine,
Feb 16, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/8VGY-D93F.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See Busch, The Future of Pre-contractual Information Duties at 234 (cited in note 2).
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pregnant customers and confront them with unwanted warnings.
What I am saying is that the law could do this on the basis of data
analytics. This is a regulatory option that was not available a few
years ago. Therefore, it has to be decided in which cases it is appropriate to use the new type of data-driven disclosure mandates
and where to draw a line. This is of course a policy question that
may be subject to conflicting points of view.
B. Financial Health Warnings
While the above examples involve only information about observable consumer preferences (for example, the interoperability
of software and the suitability of insurance) or physical characteristics (for example, pregnancy), personalization could go much further based on personality characteristics. In this vein, Professors
Porat and Strahilevitz have suggested personalizing default rules
and disclosures according to personality types, drawing on the
“Big Five” model. 34 Under this model, which is the dominant paradigm among psychologists who study personality traits, individuals can be categorized on the basis of five essential personality
characteristics (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
neuroticism or emotional stability, and openness to experience).35
The following example illustrates how personality characteristics
could be used to identify particularly vulnerable consumers who
might need special financial health warnings.
In 2016, the German legislature passed a new regulation that
compels banks to offer special advice to financially vulnerable
consumers who continuously and significantly use the overdraft
facility of their bank accounts. 36 The underlying idea is that overdraft credit is easily available and can be used without further
action but, at the same time, is comparatively expensive. Consumers who use their overdraft on a regular basis, whether for
convenience or out of ignorance of alternatives, pay a high price.
The new advice duty is aimed at protecting vulnerable consumers
from being financially overburdened as a result of improper use
of overdrafts. Thus, under the new § 504(1) of the German Civil
34

Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1434–40 (cited in note 15).
Robert R. McCrae and Oliver P. John, An Introduction to the Five-Factor Model
and Its Applications, 60 J Rsrch Personality 175, 175 (1992); Samuel D. Gosling, Peter J.
Rentfrow, and William B. Swann Jr, A Very Brief Measure of the Big-Five Personality Domains, 37 J Rsrch Personality 504, 510 (2003).
36 See Ulrich Krüger, Neue Beratungspflichten bei Verbraucherdarlehen—ein
Paradigmenwechsel, 16 Zeitschrift für Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 397, 398–99 (2016).
35
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Code 37 (BGB), banks have to offer financial advice to consumers
who are using more than 75 percent of the agreed overdraft
amount for at least six months. For customers who accept the offer, the bank has to advise them about less expensive credit options as alternatives to the overdraft, about the possible consequences of further using the overdraft, and about counseling
facilities for consumers who are experiencing financial difficulties. 38 Section 504(1) of the German Civil Code can be conceptualized as a crude example of a personalized financial health warning. Instead of prescribing a general warning regarding overdraft
facilities, the regulation focuses on a customer segment that is
identified as particularly vulnerable based on the data available
to the bank. In this regulatory model, a continuous and significant
use of overdraft is considered a signal of financial vulnerability.
However, based on psychological research, the concept of a
“vulnerable consumer” that is used as a trigger for the advisory
duty could be refined by taking into account particular vulnerabilities resulting from specific personality traits. Empirical research shows that people living on a low income tend to spend a
higher percentage of it on products or services perceived to have
a high status. 39 One reason for this seems to be the desire to compensate for perceived self-deficits (“compensatory consumption”). 40 Such behavior can be one reason for continuing financial
hardship. 41 Interestingly, recent research suggests that the preference for “status spending” is linked to certain personality
traits. 42 Extraverted people with low income spend more on status
37

Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch § 504(1).
See Frank Drost and Elizabeth Atzler, Banks under Pressure for Overdraft Rates
(Handelsblatt Global, July 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LNL5-DHQH:
38

At the behest of the [German] federal government, banks are supposed to advise
customers who have overdrawn their account by half their average incoming
payments for three months, or who have used 75 percent of their credit allowance for six months or more. Banks must offer heavily indebted customers alternatives to an overdraft.
39 See generally Laurie Simon Bagwell and B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in
a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 Am Econ Rev 349 (1996). See also generally,
Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Macmillan 1899).
40 Derek D. Rucker and Adam D. Galinsky, Compensatory Consumption, in Russell
W. Belk and Ayalla A. Ruvio, ed, The Routledge Companion to Identity and Consumption,
207 (Routledge 2013) (defining compensatory consumption as “the desire for, acquisition,
or use of products to respond to a psychological need or deficit”).
41 See Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman, Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital, 122 Econ J 933, 938–40 (2012).
42 Blaine Landis and Joe J. Gladstone, Personality, Income, and Compensatory Consumption: Low-Income Extraverts Spend More on Status, 28 Psychological Sci 1518, 1518–19 (2017).
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than their introverted peers. The interaction between income and
extraversion remains a significant predictor of status spending
when controlled for a range of demographic, financial, and other
personality variables. 43 In other words, extraverted people seem
to be more likely to engage in behavior that bears the danger of
perpetuating their financial hardship.
Based on these findings, one could use different triggers for
financial advisory duties depending on the personality of the customer. For example, for extraverted customers with low incomes,
the threshold for the advisory duty to apply could be lower than
for introverted customers (for example, 60 percent instead of 75
percent or three months instead of six months). The data required
for identifying the personality traits could be harvested from the
bank account or from other sources easily accessible to the bank
(for example, Facebook or Instagram). It goes without saying that
such a regulatory approach raises complicated issues of data privacy. Part IV.B deals with these issues.
III. DATA PRIVACY LAW
A. Personalized Privacy Notices
The information paradigm is not only a cornerstone of consumer law but also a central pillar of data privacy law. However,
as in consumer law, these disclosures fail on several accounts.
Empirical evidence suggests that, despite detailed privacy notices, many users do not know to what extent personal information is gathered and processed by companies. Often, the mere
existence of a privacy notice is interpreted as a cue signaling a
high level of privacy protection, regardless of its content. 44 One
could argue that it is rational to refrain from reading privacy policies if the costs of reading exceed the expected benefits of ignorance (rational ignorance). 45 However, empirical research suggests
See also Poor Extroverts Spend Proportionately More on Buying Status: Personality, Poverty,
and Purchases (The Economist, Aug 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/T5HE-YGD6.
43 See Landis and Gladstone, 28 Psychological Sci at 1519 (cited in note 36).
44 See Joseph Turow, et al, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy in
the Coming Decade, 3 I/S: J L & Pol Info Socy 723, 731–32 (2007). See also Florencia MarottaWurgler, Self-Regulation and Competition in Privacy Policies, 45 J Legal Stud S13, S17–20
(2016) (describing users interpreting the existence of a privacy seal as a guarantee of confidential communication).
45 See Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 159 U Pa L Rev at 709–11 (cited in note 3); Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 Iowa L Rev 1745,
1753 (2014); Yoan Hermstrüwer, Contracting around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and
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that users’ efficacy in privacy management is hampered by their
bounded rationality46 and limited motivation to control privacy. 47
In light of these findings, several proposals have been made
for making privacy disclosures more useful. The evident solution
is to simplify the disclosures by shortening the privacy notices,
making them more user-friendly, or improving the formatting.48
However, empirical studies show that simplified disclosures (for
example, “privacy nutrition labels”) or warning labels have little
effect on consumers’ comprehension of privacy disclosure, willingness to disclose information, or expectations about their privacy
rights. 49
If simplification does not make privacy notices more useful,
personalization might be an alternative. Personalizing disclosures about data sharing not only reduces the quantity of information but also could help bring to the fore those aspects that are
particularly relevant for the individual user. Moreover, current
privacy notices—whether long or short—do not take into account
the heterogeneity of privacy preferences. Empirical research indicates that privacy preferences are diverse and differ across individuals. A recent study of privacy management strategies
among Facebook users shows that users vary substantially in how

Economics of Consent and Big Data, 8 J Intell Prop, Info Tech & Electronic Commerce L
9, 18 (2017).
46 See, for example, Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte, and George Loewenstein,
Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 Sci 509, 512–13 (2015); Alessandro
Acquisti, Curtis R. Taylor, and Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 52 J Econ Lit
442, 476–78 (2016).
47 Ralph Gross and Alessandro Acquisti, Information Revelation and Privacy in
Online Social Networks, in David Matheson, Contours of Privacy 206–11 (Cambridge 2009);
Ramón Compañó and Wainer Lusoli, The Policy Maker’s Anguish: Regulating Personal
Data Behavior between Paradoxes and Dilemmas, in Tyler Moore, David J. Pym, and Christos
Ionnidis, ed, Economics of Information Security and Privacy 169, 175 (Springer 2010).
48 For example, a condensed information format (“one-pager”) has recently been proposed by the German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection. Privacy at a
Glance: “One-Pager” Presented as a Template for Transparent Privacy Notices (German
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, Nov 19, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/CQB6-DDZX.
49 See, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar and Adam Chilton, Simplification of Privacy
Disclosures: An Experimental Test, 45 J Legal Stud S41, S65–66 (2016); Sara Elisa Kettner,
Christian Thorun, and Max Vetter, Wege zur Besseren Informiertheit: Verhaltenswissenschaftliche Ergebnisse zur Wirksamkeit des One-Pager-Ansatzes und Weiterer Lösungsansätze im Datenschutz *89–97 (ConPolicy, Feb 28, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/
VDF9-L3JE (suggesting that a “one-pager” with simplified information about data use
does not significantly improve comprehension).
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they use privacy mechanisms. 50 Preferences regarding privacy
may vary among different users, both with regard to different
types of personal data (for example, location or browsing history)
and different usage purposes (for example, personalizing a service, targeted marketing, or research). Moreover, empirical research suggests that privacy risk is perceived differently by people with different demographic characteristics. 51 As a result,
different segments of the population may show different degrees
of vulnerability to privacy harms.
Currently, regulation on privacy disclosures does not take
into account different privacy preferences or vulnerabilities. However, the recently published Guidelines 52 of the Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party 53 (WP 29) on transparency under the
GDPR contain some starting points for tailoring privacy notices.
Thus, for privacy disclosures in a digital context, WP 29 recommends the use of layered privacy notices rather than displaying
all information in a single notice. 54 Another way of reducing the
complexity of privacy notices suggested by WP 29 is the use of
“push” and “pull” notices. 55 Push notices refer to the provision of
“just-in-time” disclosures that are displayed at the very moment
the user makes a decision about sharing her data, while pull notices contain additional information that are displayed only upon
request. WP 29 even suggests that “data controllers may also
choose to use additional transparency tools . . . which provide tailored information to the individual data subject which is specific
to the position of the individual data subject concerned and the
goods/services which that data subject is availing of.” 56 This seems
to point toward personalized disclosures about data usage.

50 Pamela J. Wisniewski, Bart P. Knijnenburg, and Heather Richter Lipford, Making
Privacy Personal: Profiling Social Network Users to Inform Privacy Education and Nudging,
98 Intl J Human-Computer Stud 95, 103–06 (2017).
51 See, for example, Jaspreet Bhatia and Travis D. Breaux, Empirical Measurement
of Perceived Privacy Risk ACM Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction *30 (forthcoming 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/76DF-EG42 (suggesting differences based on
age and ethnicity).
52 Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679 (Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, Apr 11, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/Z46P-XJPM.
53 The Article 29 Working Party is an advisory body made up of a representative
from the data protection authority of each EU Member State, the European Data Protection
Supervisor, and the European Commission. Under the GDPR, the European Data Protection
Board (EDPB) will replace the Article 29 Working Party.
54 Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679 at ¶ 30 (cited in note 52).
55 Id at ¶ 32.
56 Id at ¶ 31.
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Tailoring privacy disclosures to the needs of individual targets requires that the information provider identifies its audience
and their informational needs and preferences. Information about
privacy preferences could be based on past behavior. According to
a recent study, it might be possible to predict privacy preferences
with rather high accuracy by asking users a small number of
questions about data collection. 57 Based on their past privacy behavior, users could be grouped into clusters in order to provide
user-tailored privacy notices. One could even consider more advanced techniques to predict the privacy preferences of users
based on profiles of users with similar characteristics. 58
B. Personalized Privacy Assistants
While personalized privacy notices could be a first step toward making disclosures about data sharing more meaningful, it
is doubtful whether this approach will be sufficient to achieve a
personalized privacy environment that is based on user preferences. The “notice and consent” model not only risks information
overload but also requires users to make many active choices
about their privacy. The cumulative cognitive demand of these
decisions may erode users’ ability to make wise choices about data
sharing. Psychologists refer to this erosion of self-control after
making repeated decisions as “decision fatigue.” 59 This problem
may even get worse with the advent of the Internet of Things
(IoT). In the near future, smart buildings, connected cars, and entire smart cities will collect information about individuals. Under
such a scenario, the regulatory model of active choice based on
privacy notices—whether long or short, standardized or personalized—reaches its limits.
57 Pardis Emami-Naeini, et al, Privacy Expectations and Preferences in an IoT World,
Proceedings of the Thirteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security 399, 410 (2017)
(showing that, by asking users to rate from strongly agree to strongly disagree how they
feel about certain data-collection scenarios, one can predict with 88 percent accuracy how
users will answer for other scenarios after only three data points per individual).
58 Consider Norman Sadeh, et al, Understanding and Capturing People’s Privacy
Policies in a Mobile Social Networking Application, 13 Personal & Ubiquitous Computing
401, 404–08 (2009) (suggesting the use of a k-nearest neighbor approach, in which new
situations are compared with the user’s previous behaviors, to predict location-sharing
preferences).
59 See Kathleen D. Vohs, et al, Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A
Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J
Personality & Soc Psychology 883, 895–96 (2008). See also Jonathan Levav, et al, Order
in Product Customization Decisions: Evidence from Field Experiments, 118 J Pol Econ 274,
296 (2010).
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A possible solution could be to automate consent based on
personalized privacy preferences. The idea of consent assistants
that implement an automated matching of user preferences with
requests for personal data is not entirely new. An early example
was the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), a web standard
developed in 2002 by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).60
The P3P tool enables web browsers to read website privacy policies and compare them with user-specific privacy preferences and
allows users to avoid websites that do not meet their privacy preferences. The P3P tool probably came too early and largely failed
due to lack of industry participation. However, with the merger
of online and offline worlds into a new hyperconnected environment that Professor Luciano Floridi refers to as “onlife,” 61 it may
now be necessary to implement an automated matching of user
preferences with requests for personal data. Under such a scenario,
personalized privacy ecosystems could consist of two components: 62 (1) privacy-aware smart objects (for example, smart buildings or other IoT devices) that communicate machine-readable
privacy policies to users in their vicinity and (2) personalized privacy assistants (for example, smartphone apps or wearable devices) that capture the privacy preferences of their users and communicate these to the IoT devices. Through the interaction of the
two components, an automated matching of user preferences with
requests for personal data could be implemented. In particular, a
personalized privacy assistant would automatically communicate
opt-out decisions based on a user’s privacy preferences without
the need for an explicit consent in each and every scenario. However, in order to ensure that the automated settings are still in
conformity with the privacy preferences of the user, the system
could occasionally require an explicit consent.
The above scenario shows two things: First, technological
progress makes it possible to manage the increasing complexity
of smart ecosystems and tailor disclosures to the informational
needs and preferences of individual users. Second, even if the
complexity of information is reduced through personalization, a
60

See Reidenberg, et al, 30 Berkeley Tech L J at 49–50 (cited in note 7).
Luciano Floridi, The Onlife Manifesto: Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era 1
(Springer 2015).
62 See Primal Pappachan, et al, Towards Privacy-Aware Smart Buildings: Capturing, Communicating, and Enforcing Privacy Policies and Preferences 195–96 (Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Workshop Paper, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/
HMX8-BX4N. See also Hermstrüwer, 8 J Intell Prop, Info Tech & Electronic Commerce L
at 21 (cited in note 39).
61
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regulatory approach that is based on explicit consent is limited by
the cognitive capacity of the human decisionmaker. A system that
relies entirely on active choice is probably not workable in an IoT
scenario. Therefore, the wave of the future might be a mix between personalized privacy defaults implemented through privacy assistants and only occasional active choices about data
sharing.
IV. IMPLEMENTING PERSONALIZED DISCLOSURES: ELEMENTS OF
A REGULATORY DESIGN
A. Personalized Law as a Learning System
Whether personalized information is really more useful than
standardized disclosures very much depends on the quality of the
data that is used for profiling and the algorithm used for generating personalized disclosures. This problem is well-known from
recommender systems used by online shopping websites. Although Amazon, for example, uses an advanced collaborative filtering algorithm for product recommendations, 63 the suggestions
made by Amazon on the basis of past choices do not always meet
their customers’ true preferences. The lack of sophistication of
Amazon’s recommender system becomes obvious if, for example, a
reader with a keen interest in sociology and cultural history purchases the book Love as Passion: The Codification of Intimacy 64
by social theorist Niklas Luhmann and then keeps receiving recommendations for rather explicit erotic literature.
In order to avoid such errors, personalized disclosures should
be conceived as a dynamic and “learning” system in the sense that
the content of the information can change over time. In such a
dynamic system, the relevance of the information can continuously be improved. Therefore, personalized disclosures should be
combined with a monitoring system that provides feedback on actual consumer comprehension and consumer decision, which can
be used to improve the regulatory design. 65 In this vein, several
learning mechanisms could be envisaged. A simple approach
63 See generally Brent Smith and Greg Linden, Two Decades of Recommender Systems at Amazon.com, 21 IEEE Internet Computing 12 (2017).
64 Niklas Luhmann, Love as Passion: The Codification of Intimacy (Harvard 1987).
65 See generally Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U Chi L
Rev 1309, 1345–72 (2015) (describing a regulatory instrument that provides feedback on
actual consumer comprehension and product choices while meeting performance standards for consumer comprehension).
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would be to include in the system a routine asking some users for
feedback on the helpfulness of the information provided. Similar
techniques are already used by online retailers for information
that is provided voluntarily. 66 For example, some online retailers
improve the usefulness of customer reviews displayed next to a
product by asking, “Was this review helpful to you?” Even if only
a small percentage of consumers actually give an answer to the
question, this may help further improve the targeting of disclosure. 67 This approach could be combined with randomized trials.
Indeed, many online companies, such as Google and Facebook, already run a large number of randomized studies (A/B testing) on
a daily basis in order to improve their products. The same approach could be used to improve personalized disclosures. 68 On an
individual level, the information provided should be adapted to
changing circumstances in the life of the consumer and intrapersonal changes in consumer preferences. If, for example, the
consumption pattern indicates that the consumer is pregnant or
has developed an intolerance to gluten, personalized health warnings could be displayed more visibly than before.
The critics of mandated disclosure have argued that “[d]isclosurites believe they know better than the people intended to receive
disclosures how they should make decisions and what they need
to make them well.” 69 This criticism echoes Professor Friedrich
August von Hayek, who warned social scientists that “[t]o act on
the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which
enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking,
knowledge that in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do
much harm.” 70 This criticism could also be raised against bespoke
66 See Erin Geiger Smith, How Online Retailers Predict Your Perfect Outfit (Wall St
J, Aug 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U99P-BHYT.
67 See Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1450–52 (cited in note 15). Professors
Porat and Strahilevitz suggest a regime of default rules under which

a subset of the population (“guinea pigs”) is given a lot of information about various contractual terms and plenty of time to evaluate their desirability, with the
choices of particular guinea pigs becoming the default choices for those members
of the general public who have similar personalities, demographic characteristics, and patterns of observed behavior.
Id.

68

See Willis, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1336–37 (cited in note 60). See also Michael Abramowicz,
Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U Pa L Rev 929, 933–38 (2011).
69 Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, Coping with the Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 11 Jerusalem Rev Legal Stud 83, 91 (2015).
70 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, 79 Am Econ Rev 3, 7 (1989)
(reprinting Hayek’s Nobel Memorial Lecture from Dec 11, 1974). See also John Stuart
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disclosures because designing the algorithm for personalizing information requires certain assumptions about which information
is relevant to a specific individual. Therefore, in order to avoid
what Hayek called the “pretence of knowledge,” it is essential to
include into the regulatory design the feedback mechanism described above, which ensures that the information provided is really helpful for the individual consumer.
B. Personalized Disclosures and Privacy
Personalized disclosures are built on user profiling. Therefore, it is obvious that this regulatory model raises privacy concerns. In particular, one may wonder whether the use of personalized law in the field of data privacy, as described above,
amounts to fighting fire with fire. In other words, one could ask
whether the classic conflict between legal certainty and individual fairness, which personalized law purportedly is meant to
solve, is just replaced by a new conflict between individual fairness and privacy.
Within the European Union, a system of personalized law would
have to comply with Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union 71 and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union72 (TFEU), which both
guarantee the protection of personal data privacy. At the level of
secondary legislation, these fundamental principles are mainly
implemented by the GDPR. Therefore, a system of personalized
law introduced in the European Union would have to be in line
with the requirements laid down by the GDPR. First, the GDPR
would require the enactment of a (national or European) legal basis
for collecting data for the purpose of personalizing disclosures.73
Second, it is important to note that, under the GDPR, customer

Mill, On Liberty, in Dale E. Miller, ed, The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty,
The Subjection of Women, and Utilitarianism 3, 79 (Modern Library 2002) (underlining
that the individual “is the person most interested in his own well-being” and that “the
most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those
that can be possessed by any one else”).
71 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Art 8(1), 55 OJ C326 391, 397
(2012) (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”).
72 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Art 16(1), 55 OJ C326 455, 463 (2012) (mirroring the language in the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights).
73 See Regulation 2016/279, 2016 OJ L119 at 36 (requiring a legal basis for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority
vested in the controller).
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profiling, which would be the basis for personalized disclosures,
is not prohibited as such. However, Article 22(1) of the GDPR
gives every natural person the right not to be subject to a decision
based solely on automated processing, including profiling, that
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her. 74 This provision is subject to several exceptions spelled out in Article 22(2) of the GDPR. In particular,
Article 22(2)(b) allows measures based on profiling if they are authorized by EU law or the national law of an EU member state.75
This is essentially an opening clause which allows member states
to authorize automated decisions (including profiling) by law, provided that the law “also lays down suitable measures to safeguard
the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.”76
For additional complication, Article 22(4) of the GDPR lays
down a basic rule that profiling “shall not be based” on special
categories of data referred to in Article 9(1) of the GDPR, unless
there is explicit consent. 77 These “special categories” of personal
data include data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and genetic data, biometric data used for the purpose of
uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health, or
data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation.78
Considering the broad wording of Article 22(4) of the GDPR (“shall
not be based”), the provision could apply to a scenario in which
the inputs used by a personalization algorithm are nonsensitive,
but the output inferences may be, as was the case in the abovementioned example of the “pregnancy prediction score.” 79 As a
consequence, the implementation of personalized disclosures would
in many cases require an explicit consent from the consumer.
Regardless of the question whether such explicit consent is
necessary under Article 22(4) of the GDPR, it seems preferable to

74 On the scope of Article 22 of the GDPR, see Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt,
and Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not
Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 Intl Data Private L 76, 79–83 (2017).
75 Regulation 2016/279, 2016 OJ L119 at 46.
76 Regulation 2016/279, 2016 OJ L119 at 46.
77 Regulation 2016/279, 2016 OJ L119 at 46.
78 Regulation 2016/279, 2016 OJ L119 at 38.
79 See text accompanying notes 29–30. See also Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale,
Slave to the Algorithm? Why a “Right to Explanation” Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are
Looking For, 16 Duke L & Tech Rev 18, 36 (2017).
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design personalized disclosures based on an opt-in model following the general principle volenti non fit iniuria. 80 Under such a
regime, the consumer would have the right to choose between impersonal and personalized information. As a consequence, the degree of personalization of the information provided to the consumer would depend on the individual’s preference for privacy.
This approach would reflect actor heterogeneity and take into
consideration that different consumers may have different attitudes toward privacy. A consumer who prefers the benefits of personalized information must accept customer profiling. A consumer, in turn, who is not willing to accept the processing of
personal data for the purpose of customer profiling must pay a
price for the higher level of privacy protection. The price she pays
is less personalized information.
As an extension of this model, one could consider whether a
right to choose between personalized and impersonal disclosures
should also be granted to businesses that are obliged to provide
information. Under this approach, a business would be obliged to
personalize disclosures only if it already collects the relevant data
for other purposes (for example, personalized advertising). If,
however, a business opts for a privacy-friendly business model
and abstains from customer profiling, the traditional model of impersonal disclosures would apply. As a consequence, personalized
disclosures would be contingent on a double opt-in by both the
consumer and the business. Finally, this approach could also be
conceived of as a continuum of personalized information. A trader
who collects data about the consumer for profiling purposes must
use this knowledge to provide the consumer with information that
is relevant to her. More knowledge about the consumer therefore
means more responsibility for providing her with relevant information. Or in more technical terms, a more granular consumer
profile means more granular disclosure.
C. Compliance Monitoring and Algorithm Auditing
Changing the traditional model of mandatory disclosure of
standard information into a system of personalized disclosure
also has consequences for the level of compliance and enforcement.
Monitoring compliance with standardized information duties is
rather simple. Enforcement authorities, such as the Federal
80 This translates to: “To a willing person, injury is not done.” See also Busch, The
Future of Pre-contractual Information Duties at 237–38 (cited in note 2).
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Trade Commission in the United States or the Competition and
Market Authority in the United Kingdom, have to verify only
whether the information provided by a trader complies with the
list of disclosure items defined by the law. The same applies to
competitors and consumer associations in countries with systems
of decentralized and private enforcement of consumer law, such
as Germany. 81 Compliance is even simpler if the law requires the
use of certain standard forms for informing consumers, such as
the Standard European Consumer Credit Information 82 or the
European Standard Information Sheet for Mortgage Credit. 83
In contrast, monitoring compliance with personalized information duties is more complex. In the above-mentioned example 84
of a credit card company that offers travel insurance to one of its
customers, the content of the personalized disclosure depends on
the data available to the company about the customer’s traveling
habits. Similarly, in the case 85 of financial health warnings based
on consumer personality traits, the applicability of the advisory
duty depends on classifying consumers into the right customer
segment. Consequently, compliance monitoring in these cases
would involve testing whether the business effectively used the
data that was available and has drawn the right conclusions from
the data set. More generally, the information provided to an individual consumer could depend on the data available about the
consumer’s demographics, personality traits, purchasing habits,
and other patterns of past behavior.
From a market control perspective, this increases the complexity of the “disclosure landscape” and leads to a differentiation,
maybe even an “atomization,” of disclosures. Therefore, it is much
more difficult and maybe even impossible for private actors, such
as consumer organizations, to monitor whether a business complies with the applicable disclosure regulation. Effective enforcement of personalized law probably requires some form of public
81

See Justin Eugene Malbon and Allen Asher, Institutional Structures Relating to
the Administration and Enforcement of Consumer Laws, in Stephen Corones, et al, Comparative Analysis of Overseas Consumer Policy Frameworks 150, 151 (Australia 2016). See
also generally Hans-W. Micklitz and Geneviève Saumier, eds, Enforcement and Effectiveness of Consumer Law (Springer 2018).
82 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April
2008 on Credit Agreements for Consumers, Annex II, 2008 OJ L133 1, 10 (Apr 23, 2008).
83 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February
2014 on Credit Agreements for Consumers Relating to Residential Immovable Property,
Annex II, 2014 OJ L60 34 (Feb 4, 2014).
84 See text accompanying notes 27–28.
85 See text accompanying notes 31–32.
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enforcement. From a practical perspective, compliance monitoring would require that the enforcement authority perform regular
algorithm audits to ensure that the personalization algorithms
perform as provided by the law—that is, use the right criteria for
generating personalized disclosures. Such audits would also cover
the data pools used for profiling in order to assess the validity of
the data and to ensure that the data is unbiased. 86
CONCLUSION
Tailoring disclosures to the informational needs of individuals or groups of individuals increases the relevance of the information provided and reduces the risk of information overload.
Personalization could possibly rejuvenate disclosures as a regulatory tool. Maybe the reports about the death of disclosures are
greatly exaggerated. However, while the idea of personalized disclosures is as simple as it is appealing, its practical implementation proves to be difficult. Generating personalized disclosures on
the basis of user data is a form of algorithmic regulation. Therefore, compliance monitoring and enforcement will require new
regulatory approaches involving algorithm audits and data quality management in order to ensure the proper functioning of the
new data-driven regulatory system.
On a more general level, the example of personalized disclosures shows how advances in information technology could increase the granularity of legal rules in other areas of the legal
system. From this perspective, many impersonal and standardized
rules can be seen as an answer to an information problem—a concession to the bounded capacity of human information-processing.
If this is correct, artificial intelligence and superhuman information processing capabilities could redefine the optimal complexity of legal rules and refine, for example, the content of disclosures to a hitherto unachievable level of granularity.
However, while personalized disclosures may reduce the
quantity of information and increase their quality, the current
model of “notice and consent” that dominates consumer and privacy law still requires human decision-making, which is a limited
resource. With the advent of the IoT, the “notice and consent”
model could reach its limits as users will be overwhelmed by the
86 See generally Brent Mittelstadt, et al, The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate,
3 Big Data & Society (2016).
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number of requests for decisions about data sharing and privacy.
In such a scenario, personalizing disclosures in order to reduce
the amount of irrelevant information is probably not sufficient. It
may be necessary to go a further step and reduce the number of
decisions to be taken while still preserving the autonomy of the
individual. Therefore, the wave of the future, at least in data privacy law but maybe also beyond, is probably a mix of personalized
defaults implemented through virtual personal assistants and
only occasional active choices.

